Winograd Report (Second Lebanon War)
For few months now, 8 to be honest, the people of Israel are dealing with the consequences of the last summer’s war between Israel and Hezbolla.
As you all remember, last July two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbolla terrorists in Israel’s northern border. On the same day 8 other soldiers were killed and couple more injured. This was only few weeks after another soldier was kidnapped next to the Gaza border in the south of Israel.
On response, the government of Israel decided to attack the Hezbolla guerrilla/terror organization, sitting in Lebanon for more then 20 years now (1985). The Hezbolla, a shi’a militia, was founded in Lebanon by radical shi’a Muslims in order to firstly fight Israel occupation in Lebanon and further more to destroy the Zionist state and therefore to “free” Palestine”. Also the group aim to transfer Lebanon to an Islamic republic, similar to Iran, its biggest supporter and fundraiser. (More info see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah).
On the 11th of July 2006, the government of Israel decided to operate in Lebanon, in order to bring back the MIAs as well as to crash Hezbolla organization that was threatening the northern border for years. Again a bit of history – the IDF have stormed Lebanon from 1982, after the PLO has moved into southern Lebanon and attacked more then few times the north of Israel. In response IDF took over most of Lebanon ground, and only withdrawal partly in 1985. Even after 1985, the IDF held a very narrow strip of land in Lebanon that was called “the security strip”. The idea was to defend the north of Israel and to fight hezbolla on a Lebanese ground. By May 2000 Ehud Barak, then prime minister, pulled out the IDF back into the international recognized border of Israel.
The second war in Lebanon lasted 34 days (July-August 2006). It started as a military operation but recently (March 2007) was recognized by the state of Israel as a war – the second Lebanon war. During the fighting and especially after it ended, many Israelis were un-happy not only with the outcomes of the war but also with the way it was carried out by the prime-minister, defence minister and chief of staff. Many felt, despite the fact Hezbolla lost possibly more then 500 men, that Israel didn’t win the war, to say the list. The main aims of the war, to bring back the MIAs and to crush Hezbolla totally, were not achieved.
A mass protest after the war has ended led to the creation of the Winograd commission. It was after another special commission was appointed by the defence minister, but soon resigned. On September 17th 2006 The Government of Israel decided, under section 8A of The Government Act 2001, to appoint a governmental commission of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12th 2006".
Few days ago the commission has published its interim report. This section dealt with the geo-political situation prior to the July 12th attack, and with the first 5 days of the war (the rest of the report will be ready by August time).
When one read the full report (Hebrew version, 174 pages long) it is shockingly discovering the malfunctioning of key people and institutions in Israel. Among many other things, the general view of the Winograd commission is that Prime minister. Minister of defence and chief of staff are all responsible to fact that Israel have too easily started an operation and was not sure what are the aims and how will it end. Not only that but the decision making process was very poor so the army was the main voice in making decisions. The army it self was not ready and the chief of staff did mistakenly think that the Air force could win a battle.
This bit sums it up and you are invited to read more: (from Haaretz):
The report says Olmert acted hastily in leading the country to war last July 12, without having a comprehensive plan - " the prime-minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army."
Also - “ The prime minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. All this adds up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence".
Peretz - Defence Minister Amir Peretz for being unaware of the state of the Israel Defence Forces, even though he should have been.
" He did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals."
Dan Halutz - was IDF chief of staff at the time, was criticized for entering the war "unprepared," and for failing to inform the cabinet of the true state of the IDf ahead of the ground operation. The army and Halutz "were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts." Halutz displayed lack of professionalism and lack of judgment. The former army chief bears more blame, knowing that Olmert and Peretz were inexperienced in military matters. Halutz also reacted impulsively to kidnapping of the two reserve soldiers by Hezbollah, which sparked the war.
The government - The committee also levelled criticism at the entire government, saying that the cabinet voted to go to war without understanding the implications of such a decision. "The government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations without immediate military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction."
The panel is considering adding personal recommendations in its final report, which is due out in the summer.
This is an earth quick in Israel and there are possibilities Olmerts government will not survive or at list we will see personalities change.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854051.html
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/853926.html
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854016.html
full report (Hebrew) - http://go.ynet.co.il/vinograd/300407.pdf
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1177591164863&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1177591165908&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
http://info.jpost.com/C006/Supplements/Lebanon2/ |
